indexicality can be used to describe and explain the indexical potential of items of taboo language.
SWEARING IN POLITENESS RESEARCH
I have proposed above that scholarship in the field of politeness has shown that the interactional effects of swearwords are context-dependent. In this section, I provide a brief illustration of how such studies have supported these claims, focusing on just two: Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann (2003) , who have shown that, where the intention is to cause offence, the use of a swearword can function as an impoliteness strategy; and Daly et al. (2004) who have shown that swearing can also express solidarity when it functions as a positive politeness strategy. I conclude this section with a brief summary of Culpeper's (2011) argument that the meanings associated with swearwords are conventionalised, rather than conventional, (see section 2.2) and his proposal that this accounts for the range of context-specific effects they are able to generate.
2.1
Swearing as an impoliteness strategy and a positive politeness strategy Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann's (2003:1550) analysis of the following exchange illustrates how swearing can function as an impoliteness strategy. In what follows S1 is a traffic warden and S2 owns a car that has just received a parking penalty. . But we saw an example [...] in which it was not used for impoliteness. (127) This position is a useful starting point, but it raises many questions about the process by which such evaluations are ascribed to linguistic resources.
In arguing, for example, that the meanings of linguistic resources are arrived at through a process in which "particular expressions are associated in one's mind with particular contexts" (129), one question that remains unanswered is how are these associations generated? And for whom are these associations generated? To pre-empt a set of questions asked by Agha (2003:242) which I will address further in section 2.2 below:
what is involved in claiming that such cultural evaluations exist at all? And for whom do they exist? I propose that in order to address questions about cultural evaluations of (im)politeness resources, such as swearwords, we need to look to both sociolinguistics and pragmatics. In the remainder of this paper I ask what, precisely, are we assuming about the social and cultural context of language use and language users when we attempt to account for evaluations of strong swearwords? I also ask how, in pragmatic terms, we can account for the processes that lead swearwords to trigger one evaluation in one context and a different evaluation in another. Although my approach is discursive, I do not assume that because language users may evaluate swearwords differently to each other, that it does not matter what we say, or that the analyst is redundant. And neither do I propose that communication is, for the most part, an 'uncertain business'.
In addressing the questions I have posed, I build on recent developments in the theory of indexicality. I argue in particular that although the notion of indexicality is essentially pragmatic, in recent years it has been employed as a sociolinguistic concept. My aim is to show that if the pragmatic roots of indexicality are brought back into play, it raises interesting questions about the role of context in the evaluation of (im)politeness resources.
INDEXICALITY
Ochs glosses indexing in the following terms:
To index is to point to the presence of some entity in the immediate situation at hand.
In language, an index is considered to be a linguistic form that performs this function.
[…] A linguistic index is usually a structure (e.g. sentential voice, emphatic stress, diminutive affix) that is used variably from one situation to another and becomes conventionally associated with particular situational dimensions such that when that structure is used, the form invokes those situational dimensions (Ochs, 1996:411) .
She theorises this ability to assign meanings to linguistic resources as a form of cultural competence that a novice, for example a child or a newcomer to a culture, accrues in the process of becoming a member of the world s/he is entering. Ochs argues for an 'indexicality principle', which she describes as the tenet that:
[S]ocialisation is in part a process of assigning situational, i.e. indexical, meanings (temporal, spatial, social identity, social act, social activity, affective or epistemic meanings) to particular linguistic forms. (1996:410) This is a particularly useful starting point for politeness scholars because her model theorises the act of assigning social meaning to a linguistic form as a pragmatic process, and the model is therefore designed to address the link between the social and the pragmatic, as well as the global and the local, which is precisely what politeness theories attempt to do.
3.1
The Indexicality Principle (Ochs, 1996) In particular Ochs' work highlights the need for a pragmatic account of the linguistic indexing of social identity. She proposes that aspects of social identity are constructed on the basis of inferred acts and attitudes signalled through the use of specific linguistic forms. The distinctions between aspects of social identity that Ochs makes are worth recalling:
Social identity encompasses all dimensions of social personae, including roles (e.g. A key insight that derives from these distinctions is Ochs' frequently quoted observation that "few features of language directly and exclusively index gender" (341). Her analyses of talk
show that group identity such as 'gender' is likely to be inferred on the basis of the indexing of roles, which are in turn inferred on the basis of indexed stances and acts.
In illustrating the pragmatic processes by which aspects of social identity are inferred, Ochs argues, for example, that a role such as 'doctor' is likely to be inferred on the basis of stance: "one might display the stances of knowledgeability, objectivity and care to build a certain kind of medical professional identity" (424). Stances and acts are defined as follows:
Social act refers to a socially recognized goal-directed behaviour, e.g. a request, an offer, a compliment.
affective stance refers to a mood, attitude, feeling, and disposition, as well as degrees of emotional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern.
epistemic stance refers to knowledge of belief vis-à-vis some focus of concern, including degrees of certainty of knowledge, degrees of commitment to truth of propositions, and sources of knowledge, among other epistemic qualities. (Ochs, 1996:410) It is important to recall that Ochs does not assume that the link between a linguistic structure and a social meaning such as an act or a stance is in any way fixed. She argues, for example, that:
Interlocutors may use these structures to index a particular identity, affect, or other situational meaning; however, others co-present may not necessarily assign the same meaning (Ochs 1996:413) .
Ochs' position here is consistent with that of current approaches to the study of politeness: no analyst today would want to propose that a specific linguistic resource such as the use of the word sorry always indexes a social act such as 'an apology', or that the use of the word fuck invariably indexes 'an oppositional stance'. Indeed it would not be difficult to imagine contexts when the use of the word fuck could index an apology and a use of the word sorry could index an oppositional stance. And as a brief glance through any edition of A key feature of Agha's argument is that any metapragmatic activity is ideological because it is a situated activity: it has a speaker or writer, who has a particular identity and a particular set of goals. Moreover, any metapragmatic act involves speech or writing that is located within a specific medium, which has its own set of goals and its own conventions. This is significant because, in common with Ochs, Agha does not assume that metapragmatic evaluations will be consistent with each other within a given society, and instead argues that "their mutual inconsistency" often provides "crucial evidence for the co- His point therefore is that metapragmatic representations provide evidence that accounts for how linguistic variables, such as the features of an accent like RP, come to function as a resource for the making of meaning and the indexing of social identity. However he also highlights the ideological nature of this process and the extent to which such meanings are created, sustained and challenged through on-going acts of evaluation.
The relevance of Agha's work to the concerns of this paper, the evaluation of swearword use, is that it has the potential to generate a different set of research questions, and a different focus, to those of the studies discussed in Section 2 above, and as such this approach has the potential to add a layer of explanation to the findings of those studies.
Such an analysis would begin with a search for evidence of regularity in the range of social meanings generated by the use of swearwords by analysing the metadiscourses that recur across different types of situated cultural text. Agha's account would predict that such evidence would be found in metapragmatic comments on swearing that occur in the media, in the use and responses to swearing that are in cultural texts such as television soaps, novels, etc., as well as in the evaluations evident in everyday interaction. However, significantly, this approach would not predict that interlocutors will have equal access to either the metadiscourses or the values generated by these metadiscourses, or have the same relationship with them. As (Agha, 2003:242) points out, interlocutors may align their own self-images with these social meanings or transform them through their own metasemiotic work.
Agha's approach predicts that evidence of a conventionalised understanding of the significance of formulae such as swearwords, as well as of alternative understandings, is likely to be found in the systematic study of the metadiscourses of swearword use. This is an important step in building up a picture of the processes involved in individual and shared evaluations of swearword use. How these understandings are generated in the first place is highly relevant however since, as Agha points out, these are ideologically charged. That issue is addressed by Silverstein's (2003) notion of the 'indexical order', which I briefly outline below.
3.3
The indexical order (Silverstein, 2003) Silverstein claims that the notion of an 'indexical order' is necessary if we are "to relate the micro-social to the macro-social frames of analysis of any sociolinguistic phenomenon" (2003:193) . He describes the relationship between Agha's notion of a register and indexical orders as follows:
The existence of registers ....is an aspect of the dialectical process of indexical order, in which the n +1st-order indexicality depends on the existence of a cultural schema of enregisterment of forms perceived to be involved in n-th order indexical meaningfulness; the forms as they are swept up in the n +1st order valorization become strongly presupposing indexes of that enregistered order, and therefore in particular of the ideological ethno-metapragmatics that constitutes it and endows its shibboleths with n +1st-order indexical value. (193) Silverstein's points here are probably best understood by drawing on Eckert's ( York City study, which Silverstein uses as his example, the populations may be social class strata (Eckert, 2008:463 ).
An n+1 st order index would be a variable that has, in Labov's terms, become a marker in that it is a linguistic variant whose use correlates with variation in style. As Eckert, following Silverstein, points out: a form that has acquired an indexical value can always be reinterpreted so that it acquires "an n+1 st value" (2008:463). However, an N+1 st order index has a different significance to the notion of a marker in variationist sociolinguistics in that, within an indexical approach, it leads to a focus on the process of meaning making:
The difference between the notion of marker as used in variation studies and the sociolinguists. For example although, as Eckert points out, Trudgill argued that it was the "perceived toughness of working-class men" that explained language change in that it led to middle-class men adopting regional working-class variants, she goes to argue that this account does not address the process by which "meanings become associated with social categories or with variables" (Eckert, 2008:455) .
Following Silverstein (2003) , Eckert reinterprets the findings of large-scale social surveys from this perspective, showing the significance of explaining the correlational data of such surveys as indexical. Starting from the premise that once an association has been made between a social group (for example, a specific class of people in New York) and a form used by that group (for example, post-vocalic /r/) that form is available to be used indexically (e.g. by a worker in a New York store to indicate something about social status).
Her argument is that the goal of sociolinguistics today should be to explain how variants function by focusing on the ideological field that generates the indexical potential of variants.
She describes this field as a product of "the continual reconstrual of the indexical value of a variable" (Eckert, 2008:463-4) . Her point is also that whenever a linguistic resource is used, it has the potential to change that field.
The field is fluid, and each new activation has the potential to change the field by building on ideological connections. Thus variation constitutes an indexical system that embeds ideology in language and that is in turn part and parcel of the construction of ideology. (453) 
TOWARDS A DISCURSIVE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO THE INDEXICAL VALUE OF STRONG SWEARWORDS
Although the indexical approach I have discussed so far provides a framework for exploring the scope of the indexical field, I would argue that currently it is, essentially, a sociolinguistic rather than a pragmatic approach: it does not describe or explain how, within a specific linguistic interaction, the use of a specific resource comes to index a specific stance, a specific act, or a specific aspect of social identity. (Sperber and Wilson, 2011:157) .
In particular the following claims about the nature of linguistic encoding inform my analysis:
[T]he occurrence of a word in an utterance provides a piece of evidence, a pointer to a concept involved in the speaker's meaning. It may so happen that the intended concept is the very one encoded by the word, which is therefore used in its strictly literal sense. However, we would argue that this is no more than a possibility, not a I. The identification of the explicit content of an utterance is as inferential a process as the recovery of implicatures.
II. Context does not precede an utterance, but is a function of utterance interpretation.
The context of an utterance is a set of assumptions assigned by the hearer in the process of interpreting an utterance. The context of an utterance from this perspective is the specific set of assumptions that a hearer or reader activates when generating the most relevant interpretation (to her) of the particular linguistic forms, intonations patterns, etc. that constitute the utterance.
III. The range of meanings that a specific use of a strong swearword is assigned will have been derived from the pool of assumptions that make up the individual cognitive environments of individual interlocutors. However, I do not assume that the cognitive environment of one interlocutor will overlap with that of another.
In what follows my aim is to show that an approach that links relevance theory to the sociolinguistic theorisation of indexicality can help to explain the generation of specific social meanings ascribed to specific uses of swearwords. I begin with evidence of the 1st order indexing potential of strong swearwords, then consider evidence that these forms have been 'swept up in the N + 1st order valorization' process by which they become 'strongly presupposing indexes of that enregistered order' (Silverstein, 2003:193 English, for example, it does not begin to provide an explanation for anything that we see within the corpus". However, even though this is only one set of data, and it can only indicate tendencies, it does provide preliminary evidence that, at a particular moment in British culture, the word fuck is most likely to be used by a specific population: working class males (although the results for the AB and DE class raise some interesting questions that are worth investigating further).
The sociolinguistic approach to indexicality proposes that "variables index demographic categories not directly but indirectly, through their association with qualities and stances that enter into the construction of categories" (Eckert, 2008:455) . The correlation between population and word-use would suggest that the word fuck has the potential to be transformed from a 1st order index (strong swear words→working class males) so that it acquires an n+1st value. On the basis of folk-linguistic knowledge as well as sociological evidence, the link between the population 'working class males' and the use of vernacular forms, including swearwords, has clearly been subject to such a process for some time. But observing that such a correlation exists tells us nothing about how it is that "meanings become associated with social categories or with variables" (Eckert, 2008:455) .
And without an engagement with those processes there can be no explanation for how such associations come and go, or how they change over time. It also cannot tell us anything about whether all members of a society make those associations, or just some members.
Before considering how these processes might be addressed, it is worth setting out evidence from empirical studies of language-use that suggests the scope of the indexical field of strong swearwords. Interpreting Stapleton's survey data from an indexical perspective therefore, it can be seen as evidence that these forms have been re-interpreted so that they acquire an "n +1st
value" (Eckert, 2008:463) process. From Silverstein's perspective this would predict that when strong swearwords are used by a population other than that presupposed by the 1st order index, they will be subject to an on-going set of cultural evaluations based on register stereotyping, which is to say that these specific forms of taboo language will have become "strongly presupposing indexes of that enregistered order" (Silverstein, 2003:193 In what follows I report on an analysis of a corpus of newspaper reports made available by the database Nexis which shows that the use of strong swearwords is regularly rationalised in ways that explicitly link affective stances, social roles and group identities to the register stereotyping discussed above. The reports are situated texts (in Agha's terms): the evaluations take place within the newspaper setting and therefore are a product of the genre which would include, for example a specific agenda: the goal of such a report might be to sensationalise an act or raise public concern about an issue in order to engage as wide a readership as possible and therefore sell more newspapers. And since the reports are designed for a mass readership, any evaluation has to be rationalised by drawing on relatively uncontroversial perceptions of swearword use if it is to be meaningful to that readership. From a relevance-theoretical perspective, then, the reports assume (but cannot guarantee) that the author and potential readers have a 'mutual cognitive environment', in the sense that key assumptions that are I also show that in instances of swearing that do not map onto these parameters, this same metadiscourse is used to evaluate uses of swearwords negatively. However, what these evaluations also show is that these uses of swearwords are likely to have been evaluated quite differently by other social groups, and would suggest that there are other, conflicting, metadiscourses of swearing that exist alongside those informed by the dominant ideology evident here, and which would repay further investigation.
Evidence of a metadiscourse that normalises swearword use
Each of the reports discussed in this section is triggered by Rooney's specific act of swearing at the camera. There are many more implications to be drawn from an analysis of these reports, here I have limited my account to show that each refers to swearing in general terms and each, in invoking a set of contextual assumptions (CAs) for interpreting the use of swearwords generates contextual implications (CIs) that normalise occurrences of swearing by football players during football matches. What is particularly interesting here is that these CIs are generated by different sets of CAs. The pragmatically generated explicatures of the italicised element here require some degree of narrowing. For example, nobody must be narrowed to signify 'no footballers' and on the pitch must be narrowed to signify 'on the football field during a game of football'. If the explicatures of the italicised element of Neville's utterance are something like: "if swearing on the football pitch is banned there will be no footballers available to play in matches" then interpreted in conjunction with the CA: "football matches can't be played unless footballers are on the pitch" then the CI would be something like: "If football matches are to be played then footballers must be allowed to swear". What makes this interpretation relevant in the context of the propositions expressed in the remainder of the article is that it justifies the use of swearing on the pitch: if, given the evidence that football players swear on the pitch, swearing was to incur a ban, then all players will be banned. For football to continue, then swearing in games of football must continue.
The second report also generates a CI that normalises swearing on the football pitch, but in this case, this interpretation is generated by an assumed link between the football field with the workplace, and this link accounts for the FA's previous lack of reaction to Rooney's swearing. If the propositions expressed by the italicised part of the final sentence here are to be read as an explanation of the FA's lack of action, the reader needs to supply a set of implicated premises which together with the explicatures of the utterance generate the implicated conclusion: "swearing is to be expected on the football field".
Specifically, these CAs include the presuppositions that:
(a) the football field is a workplace setting (b) swearing always occurs in workplace settings.
For these premises to be interpreted as relevant CAs, the explicitly communicated element must be pragmatically modified so that the term workplace is narrowed to signify 'industrial workplaces', and the 'loose use' (Wilson and Sperber, 2007) of the item industrial language is narrowed to signify 'swearing'. The CI "swearing is to be expected on the football field"
can therefore be justified in the following terms: if the football field is an industrial workplace and swearing always occurs in industrial workplaces, then swearing will occur on the football field. What makes this a relevant interpretation of the italicised elements in the context of the remainder of the article is that it explains why the FA had not responded to Rooney's previous swearword use. The evaluation of swearing in this report then is that swearing is unremarkable in certain circumstances. I would also argue that, in British culture, working out what those circumstances are requires the reader to be able to link a particular type of workplace to the use of swearing: i.e. industrial rather than, say, office workplaces; and to link this to working class rather than middle class work.
A third report that also rationalises swearing as normal in football matches does so through linking swearing with emotion: Spurs boss Harry Redknapp said: "I wouldn't expect my players to run up to a camera and swear no more than I would have to tell them 'Don't mug an old lady on the way home'.
"Why do you have to go up and swear into the camera when there's kids watching?
We don't need it. The references to mugging and not swearing in front of children and women here are relevant if the reader supplies the CAs:
(a) old ladies should not be mugged (b) children and women should not be exposed to swearing
This evaluation of Rooney's swearing draws on the indexical field of swearword use set out above. The acceptability of swearing in an adult, male environment is implied by its contrast with the list of proscribed behaviour: it is not swearing itself that is proscribed, it is doing so in the wrong environment. There is a further ideological link being generated here:
Redknapp's evaluation draws on and perpetuates a register stereotype of a type of man whose lack of morals is evident through their treatment of women: whether it is mugging them or swearing in front of them (and indeed to interpret his utterance as meaningful, these two acts need to be seen as equivalent in some way). And Redknapp's professed inability to understand such behaviour constructs a persona for himself as someone who would not behave towards women in this way.
This view that Rooney's swearing is an act of misjudgement is also evident in the following quotation from a former referee:
"But you wouldn't swear in the face of your parents like that, you wouldn't do it in church and you wouldn't let off steam like that in the middle of a crowded supermarket, so why should you get away with it at a football match which is being shown all over the world live on TV?" ( Here the implicated premises include the CA: "swearing in front of one's parents or in a church is not acceptable". The reader also has to make a link between swearing and emotion. For the proposition in the second italicised clause to be perceived as relevant, the phrase let off steam, which has the potential to signify 'express emotion' through a range of forms, has to be narrowed here to signify 'express emotion through swearing'. Also the term crowded supermarket has to be broadened to signify 'in public'. These pragmatic inferences about the explicit meaning of these clauses are necessary if the causal connection implied by the word so is to be justified here. The interpretation here is that if (a) in a public place, it is wrong to express strong emotion through swearing and (b) a televised football match is a public space then (c) it is unacceptable to express strong emotion through swearing in a televised football match.
Note again that the act is condemned because it is seen as a misjudgement about where swearing should occur rather than because swearing itself is to be condemned. Note also that the writer here is, in listing proscribed behaviour and raising questions about Rooney's expectations, also constructing his persona in opposition to that of a man who swears in the wrong context and is unable to control the expression of emotion.
The metadiscursive construction of swearing as an expression of emotion is also employed in the following example which again evaluates Rooney's behaviour as misguided:
What his swearing did have, though, was a deep, deep, painful anger. Which is, I
guess, why even I was taken aback. Swearing is normally just swearing. But
Rooney's swearing was something else. It wasn't Rooney's words that counted, it was the thought behind them. It was about what he thinks we think of him. And that thought was thick with violence and anger and hatred. He opened not just his mouth but his heart to us. And that, we learnt, was not a nice place to be. (What the…?
Sport loses its way in a four-letter moral maze. The Independent April 6, 2011)
Rooney's swearing is evaluated as misguided here on the grounds that it constitutes an uncontrolled exposure of deeply felt emotions. The reader needs to activate the CA (a) the public display of "deep painful anger" is inappropriate if she is to interpret the clause "even I was taken aback" as relevant. Again, the writer here is indexing his own stance as someone who can see swearing as "just swearing" in some contexts, but he constructs this incident as the behaviour of a man who is unable to control his emotions, and therefore is doing more than "just swearing".
The link between swearing and emotion is also invoked in this final example:
What made Rooney's behaviour all the more puzzling was the fact that, at the end of a troubled year on and off the pitch, he had just completed a fantastic hat-trick to haul his team back from the brink of a defeat that would have damaged their title hopes. 'Why do some of these young players have to be so angry with the world?' Paltrow's use of the word cunt lacks 'authenticity'. The first report cited here evaluates the swearword use as designed to shock the audience for the sake of self-promotion.
And there seemed to be something curiously staged about the incident. Was
Paltrow just trying to be edgy and cool on late-night television? Or -even worsedid she swear merely to grab attention and help promote her new cookbook.
(Gwynnie, I swear you're an old phoney. Mail Online April 30th 2011)
Here the label phoney implies that whatever social identity Paltrow is attempting to index through her swearword use here, it has not been successfully indexed, and this failure is down to the lack of authenticity in her swearword use. The use of the word 'staged' is relevant only if a reader is able to interpret the pragmatically inferred explicature:
(a) Paltrow's use of the swearword was not spontaneous in the context of the implicated premise that:
(b) Uses of swearwords that are not spontaneous are inappropriate and is therefore able to generate the CI:
(c) Paltrow's use of the swearword is inappropriate
In the indexical field mapped out above, the use of strong swearwords is to be expected when speakers respond to emotion or where it is justified by an aspect of social identity: i.e.
if the speaker is male and working class. If this is the measure of appropriate swearword use in the metadiscourse, then Paltrow's swearword use is not appropriate.
Moreover, in the above report, and a second report cited below, it is implied that the reason Paltrow's use of the word was unacceptable was because it was designed to index an aspect of social identity that she was not entitled to index. In the above report the features of that identity are named as edgy and cool, in the report below as a bad girl.
WHO does Gwyneth Paltrow think she is? Seems like she doesn't know any longer...
She can't pretend this slipped out accidentally like Janet Jackson's wardrobe malfunction. Any seasoned performer who uses this kind of language on TV does it on purpose. Gwynnie's been Hollywood's goody-two-shoes for so long and she's trying very hard to be a bad girl. Again, the CI here is that artful, insincere uses of swearwords are not acceptable uses. To interpret the first italicised elements of the report here as relevant, it is necessary to generate the implicated premise that uses of swearwords are acceptable only if they are the spontaneous expression of a particular type of identity, and that to pretend otherwise is "disingenuous, devious and dishonest". And moreover the type of identity that might be indexed through the use of strong swearwords is certainly not the 'smug elite' that is referred to in the second italicised element, which is the title of the piece.
The evaluations of the use of cunt by Paltrow, and the implied use of the word by Toksvig are clearly drawing on the metadiscourses outlined above, in which swearing under certain circumstances is acceptable: the criticisms presuppose the truth of the propositions that form that metadiscourse. These instances are therefore not legitimised in the activities of the 'socially locatable persons' whose views are promulgated in the specific sections of the national press I have cited here. The evaluations nicely illustrate Agha's argument that the metapragmatic activity evident in cultural texts draws on and perpetuates 'metapragmatic stereotypes' which he argues are "identifiable for a particular social domain of evaluators, e.g. a particular sub-population within a society" (242). However, as I indicated above, Agha also argues that metapragmatic evaluations, because they are ideological, will be not be consistent across a given society. This would predict that there are likely to be alternative metadiscourses of swearing that are not being activated in the sorts of media text I have cited. I would argue, in particular that there is a metadiscourse of women's legitimate uses of swearwords that is still to be mapped, both within and beyond such texts, which would bring these inconsistencies into view. The fact that Toksvig and Paltrow used or implied the use of a swearword that is perceived as one of the strongest in Rooney is not condemned for swearing per se. The analysis shows that, within the identified metadiscourse, the use of strong swearwords is to be expected by a man in a specific work environment, and it is to be expected of someone experiencing strong emotions. Where Rooney's swearing is evaluated as unacceptable, it is because it is not hidden from people who, according to this metadiscourse, should be protected from being exposed to swearing, and because it indicates that he is not able to stop himself from publicly displaying strong emotions. This mapping also provides evidence of the ideologies that are activated when the uses of swearwords by groups other than working class males are evaluated. The normalisation of swearing as behaviour that is associated with the expression of emotion and with working class, male workplaces informs comments which were critical of Rooney, as well as those that evaluated his swearing as justified in some way, or else empathised with it. My analysis of Paltrow's use of the word cunt and Toksvig's implied use of the word suggest that these same associations are used to construct these uses as inappropriate. These reports imply that swearword use that is not justified within the terms of this metadiscourse is to some extent delegitimised. However, as Eckert argues, an indexical field is fluid, and "each new activation has the potential to change the field by building on ideological connections" (453). The existence of such a metadiscourse does not rule out the existence of others, and does not rule out the possibility that other metadiscourse are already in existence and have the potential to change the scope of the indexical field of strong swearwords..
In this paper I have argued that approaching linguistic formulae from an indexical perspective can generate a set of research questions that have the potential to open up the study of (im)politeness phenomena so that it is possible to address the range of meanings a resource might generate in a given culture at a given moment in time, without relying on assumptions about the shared 'core' meaning of that resource. My argument is that this approach allows the claim that the effects of swearwords are conventionalised (Culpeper, 2011: 127) to be explored in a more systematic way. It also allows the claim to be addressed discursively. In showing some of the regularities that come to light through a mapping of the indexical field of strong swearwords, I have shown that the evaluative behaviour evident in news reports can be used to explain the meanings ascribed to specific uses of taboo language. I have also argued that approaching these evaluations from a relevance-theoretical perspective, the process whereby indexical values are assigned to swearwords is brought into view.
There are clearly many more social meanings indexed by strong swearwords than those addressed by these newspaper texts. For example, there is a whole metadiscourse of women's use of swearwords that is still to be mapped, and which does not feature in the variables are underspecified, gaining more specific meanings in the context of styles" and (b) "variation does not simply reflect, but also constructs, social meaning and hence is a force in social change". ii In the tradition of relevance theorists, I use he to refer to a communicator, and she to refer to the interpreter of an act of communication.
iii Blakemore (2011, 3541 ) glosses a cognitive environment as "the set of assumptions that an individual is capable of representing at any given time. A mutual cognitive environment is a cognitive environment which is shared by a group of individuals and in which it is manifest that they share it with each other."
